The
Western democracies have declared that their strong stances against the current
military regime in Burma* reflect principled stands against the 1988 massacres
of pro-democracy demonstrators, the failure of the regime to recognize the
results of the 1990 general elections (which resulted in a landslide victory
for the main opposition parties), and the regime’s continuing human rights
abuses. Yet it can be argued that such a strong and sustained position would
have been less likely had the Cold War not ended and Burma’s importance in the
global competition between the superpowers not significantly waned. Lacking any
pressing strategic or military reason to cultivate Burma, and with few direct
political or economic interests at stake, countries like the United States and
the United Kingdom can afford to isolate the Rangoon regime and impose upon it
pariah status. If this was indeed the calculation made in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, it is possible that the changes that have occurred in the strategic
environment since then may prompt a reconsideration of these policies.
Burma lies where South, Southeast, and East Asia meet; there the
dominant cultures of these three subregions compete for influence. It lies also
across the “fault lines” between three major civilisations-Hindu, Buddhist, and
Confucian.1 At critical times in the past, Burma has been a cockpit for rivalry
between superpowers. Today, in the fluid strategic environment of the early
twenty-first century, its important position is once again attracting attention
from analysts, officials, and military planners.2 Already, Burma’s close
relationship with China and the development of the Burmese armed forces have
reminded South and Southeast Asian countries, at least, of Burma’s geostrategic
importance and prompted a markedly different approach from that of the West.
INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES BEFORE 1988
For centuries, the part of Southeast Asia that eventually became
modern Burma was largely isolated from, and ignorant of, the wider world. Burma
was visited by travelers and traders from a very early date, and by Europeans
from the fourteenth century, but it was of truly strategic interest only to its
immediate neighbors, with whom it fought a number of wars. India, China, and
Thailand have all invaded, and been invaded by, Burma at various times.3
As the major European empires expanded, however, and geopolitics
began to be practiced on a global scale, the world’s most powerful countries
came to recognize that Burma occupied a geostrategic position of some
importance. In 1824-26 Britain annexed the coastal districts of Arakan and
Tenasserim; one of its prime motives was to safeguard eastern India and close
the gap between Bengal and the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca, and
Singapore.4 Sixty years later, both the United Kingdom and France were
competing for influence in the Burmese court at Mandalay. Indeed, by attempting
to balance the rivalry between these two colonial powers the last king of
Burma, Thibaw (reigned 1878-85), probably helped precipitate his own downfall.5
The British authorities in Delhi subsequently saw Burma as a bulwark against
French westward expansion from Indochina. Burma also represented a possible
overland trade route to China.
In 1937, after Japan’s invasion of China, Japan’s opponents
quickly realized that Burma offered Chiang Kai-shek’s embattled Nationalist (or
Kuomintang) government a lifeline to Europe. Even before the Burma Road was
officially opened in January 1939, vital military supplies were flowing north
to Chung– king through the port of Rangoon.6 During the Second World War, Burma
was a major theatre of operations. Both Allied and Japanese strategists
appreciated that it not only provided China with access to the Indian Ocean and
dominated the Bay of Bengal but lay between Japan’s conquests in Southeast Asia
and the Allied bastion of British India. The campaign for Burma, which lasted
from December 1941 until August 1945, was the longest and one of the most
difficult of the entire conflict.7
After the war, Burma continued to figure in the security
calculations of key Western policy makers. The Ministry of Defence in London,
for example, anxious to retain rights to use Burmese ports and airfields,
persuaded the government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee to include such
access in its 1947 independence agreement with the Burmese. In the face of
rising nationalist sentiment in the Asia-Pacific region and the danger of
communist insurgencies in such colonies as Malaya, Mingaladon airfield outside
Rangoon became an important factor in British defence planning. It was
considered necessary “in connection with His Majesty’s Government’s air
reinforcement route to the Far East, and, in the event of an emergency arising,
for the rapid movement of air and land forces, to and through Burma. Burma was
strategically important to Britain also as one of the main sources of rice for
its Asian dependencies, where food shortages were fuelling anticolonial
sentiment. Because Burma was inside the sterling currency area, Britain could
purchase rice there for places like Malaya without using its precious reserves
of U.S. dollars.
After Burma was granted independence in 1948, its geostrategic
position attracted even wider attention. Close to China, India, and Vietnam, it
was seen as being “on the periphery of the free world.”9 During the 1950s, when
Rangoon was threatened by a number of insurgencies, including one led by the
powerful Communist Party of Burma, British Commonwealth countries made
considerable efforts to shore up the fledgling governments (1948-58 and
1960-62) of Prime Minister U Nu.10 To the members of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organisation, Burma was a “domino” of almost as much strategic importance as
Vietnam. The United States, for example, firmly believed that “should Burma come
under communist domination, a communist military advance through Thailand might
make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible.”11 To the United
Kingdom, the loss of Burma to the Chinese-sponsored Burmese communists would
threaten the security of Malaya (then including Singapore) and the
strategically important Straits of Malacca.12 Some Western analysts (who
clearly had not experienced the harsh terrain) were concerned about “a
relatively easy invasion route from Yunnan Province across northern Burma to
India’s Assam province.13 It has been claimed that India had a tacit
understanding with Burma over the joint defence of the Assam-northern Burma
area in the event of a Chinese invasion.14
Burma may not have been the most important Southeast Asian country
facing communist insurgency at the time, but all these concerns underscored
Burma’s strategic role in the ideological struggle then being conducted in the
Asia-Pacific region.
The United States and its allies were convinced that China was
actively supporting communist “subversion” throughout Southeast Asia and that
this effort was being coordinated, or at least encouraged, by the Soviet
Union.15 Burma could not be persuaded to join any military alliances, but the
West identified it as an ideal place for “listening posts” from which to
observe developments inside China. At the height of the Korean War, the United
States even drew up plans to use Burma as a springboard from which to launch the
southern half of a “double envelopment operation” against China.16 From 1951
until the mid-1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency provided covert military
support to Kuomintang troops who had fled China after the communist victory in
1949 and established bases in Burma. With additional troops flown in from
Taiwan, and supplements of local insurgents, these forces eventually exceeded
twelve thousand men. They staged seven unsuccessful “invasions” of China before
Burmese pressure in the United Nations forced the United States to end its
assistance to the Nationalists and transfer some six thousand Kuomintang troops
to Taiwan.17 Only when Rangoon sought Beijing’s help in 1961 and twenty
thousand People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers conducted a joint operation
with Burmese forces in northeastern Burma were the last remnants of the
Kuomintang finally driven into Thailand.18
The secret support of the United States for the Kuomintang helped
to confirm the reservations of Burma’s leaders about involvement with foreign
powers. They felt strongly that Burma could and should manage its own affairs.
Prime Minister Nu was acutely conscious of the need to maintain good relations
with Burma’s powerful neighbor China, but otherwise he strove for strict
neutrality in international affairs.19 Burma was desperately in need of
external assistance to recover from the war, but Nu preferred aid from
“independent” countries like Israel and Yugoslavia; he was a major force behind
the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.
After General Ne Win’s coup in 1962, Burma retreated even farther
from the mainstream of global affairs. Fearful of almost all outside
influences, the new military regime adopted and strengthened the former
government’s neutral foreign policy, shunning most international contacts. In
1979 Burma even withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement, on the grounds
(notwithstanding its own socialist system) that the movement had become unduly
influenced by the Eastern bloc.20 In any case, the doctrinaire regime introduced
by Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Program Party permitted little external
participation in the country’s economy. It still welcomed foreign aid,
particularly after the failure of its own policies, but only on a scrupulously
evenhanded basis. It was most amenable to assistance provided by multilateral
bodies like the United Nations and through arrangements like the Colombo Plan.*
After the military coup and Burma’s withdrawal into xenophobia and
isolationism, its geostrategic standing greatly diminished. The country rarely
figured in published studies of regional security. Yet to a certain extent it
was still seen as a prize in the global competition between the major power
blocs. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China
all maintained large missions in Rangoon, facilities that served as bases for
active diplomatic and intelligence campaigns.21 Divided countries-the two
Koreas, East and West Germany, and North and South Vietnam-also competed for
Burma’s diplomatic support in forums like the UN General Assembly. Burma’s
success in balancing all these pressures can perhaps be gauged by the fact that
at the height of the Cold War a Burmese, U Thant, was twice unanimously elected
secretary-general of the United Nations.22
International interest in Burma’s geostrategic position, however,
declined even further after the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the
Cold War in 1990. Indeed, as noted, had it not done so, it is unlikely that the
United States (and its friends and allies) would have felt able to adopt such
strong policies against the new military government in Rangoon. Ironically, it
was the imposition of economic sanctions and arms embargoes by Western
countries that encouraged the Rangoon regime to develop a much closer relationship
with Beijing, something that has in turn prompted other Asia-Pacific countries
to reassess their relations with Burma.
THE MODERN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in
1988 and its subsequent introduction of a range of new policies broadly
coincided with dramatic shifts in the global strategic environment. The end of
communism in Russia and Eastern Europe led to the emergence of the United
States as the world’s sole superpower. Accordingly, the agenda of the United
Nations became much more aligned to U.S. interests and values, and more
interventionist in nature. This in turn prompted a backlash by a diverse group
of countries united by a desire to deny the United States a paramount position
in world affairs. Also, with the close of the Cold War came the end of the
relative stability and predictability of the old power balance. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them
greatly complicated management of the strategic environment. Finally, a number
of new states and substate actors appeared, and new tensions arose.
As a result of all these developments there now exists much
greater fluidity, and thus greater uncertainty, in international relations. In
particular, the last twenty years have seen the rise of China, which is now
considered a serious challenger to the preeminence of the United States in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Perhaps more than any other factor, perceptions of China now
generally shape the ways in which regional states are responding to changes in
the strategic environment. These perceptions may be based on a selective
reading of history and on enduring myths about China’s worldview, but in
international relations perceptions become realities.23 Governments make national
policy on the basis of what they believe to be the case as much as on the
objective truth. For example, not since the eighteenth century has China
harbored expansionist ambitions toward or engaged in open hostilities with
Burma, Thailand, or Laos; China once included parts of these and other states
in a list of “lost territories,” but this list has been omitted from Chinese
public statements since the 1967 Cultural Revolution. Yet regional perceptions
of China’s long-term strategic intentions are still coloured by the historical
evidence of China’s support for communist guerrilla movements during the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, its war with India in 1962, its (unsuccessful) invasion of
Vietnam in 1979, and its more recent occupation of reefs and islands in the
South China Sea.24 China’s economic growth and military development are being
watched closely by analysts in the region, and any signs that China is looking
to extend its strategic reach are considered causes for concern.
In this regard, Burma’s close relationship with China since 1989,
in particular its defence links, has attracted considerable attention. Over the
past fourteen years there have been numerous reports in the international media
and professional journals to the effect that China has provided the Rangoon
regime with a wide range of military equipment, arms production facilities, and
training programs.25 There has also been a spate of news items that China and
Burma have an intelligence-sharing arrangement and that Chinese military personnel
are helping to operate some electronic surveillance equipment reportedly
acquired by the Burmese armed forces.26 Some commentators have gone farther and
claimed that China has already established a permanent military presence in
Burma, one that includes naval and air bases and specialized facilities to
replenish Chinese naval vessels (including submarines) during regular
deployments to the Indian Ocean.27 Burma has even been characterized as a
“pawn” of China, or at least a satellite state.
While some of these reports are true, either in whole or in part,
the accuracy of others is highly suspect. Few can be verified from independent
sources, and a number are clearly based on unsubstantiated rumours or idle
speculation. Some of the more outlandish stories may have been planted
deliberately by self-interested parties.28 Yet, accurate or not, these and
similar reports have played on existing suspicions of China’s aims and helped
fuel a more immediate concern that Burma’s relationship with China could threaten
regional stability. These perceptions have in turn prompted a number of
specific policy decisions by Southeast Asian governments. For example, aside
from the strong economic motives that are clearly present, the reluctance of
these states to join in the West condemnation of the Rangoon regimen almost
certainly stems in part from a fear of driving Burma farther into the arms of
China.29 In addition, among the reasons why Burma was admitted to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 against the wishes of
the West was an apparent desire on the part of member states to draw Rangoon
away from Beijing’s orbit and prevent it from actually becoming China’s
stalking horse in the region.30
India, at first an outspoken critic of the State Law and Order
Restoration Council, soon reassessed the value of a hard line against Rangoon.
Since 1989 New Delhi has watched anxiously as Chinese capital, aid, and
military equipment have flowed into Burma. Fears of China’s long-term
intentions have been heightened by news reports of Chinese naval bases being
constructed on the Burmese coast and of intelligence collection stations being
developed in and around the Andaman Sea.31 As one Indian analyst puts it,
While China professes a policy of peace and friendliness toward
India, its deeds are clearly aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in
order to marginalise India in Asia and tie it down to the Indian
sub-continent…. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have been assiduously
and cleverly cultivated towards this end. Myanmar [Burma] has been recently
added to this list.32
All of these factors prompted a major policy switch in the early
1990s, as India too became afraid of pushing Burma further into China’s
embrace. New Delhi began establishing closer bilateral relations with Rangoon
through increased political, trade, and even military ties.33 At the same time,
India began trying to develop its economic relations with such Southeast Asian
countries as Thailand, while representing itself to countries such as Singapore
and Vietnam as a strategic counterweight to China.34
Others in the Asia-Pacific region have also been feeling uneasy.
Japan, for example, is apparently concerned about China’s increasing influence
in Burma and its implications for regional stability, in light of China’s
rivalry with India. This may be one reason why the Japanese government has been
keen to restore aid to Burma, despite the opposition of the United States and
other Western democracies.35 Japan is also reported to be worried about the
security of its sea-lanes through the Malacca Strait, which are essential for
its Middle Eastern oil imports. The possibility of increased Chinese naval
deployments to the Indian Ocean and the reported construction of Chinese naval
and intelligence facilities in the Mergui Archipelago have added a new factor
for Japan’s consideration.36
The Republic of Korea shares some of Japan’s concerns. It too is
dependent on oil shipments from the Middle East and hopes to develop its
“textbook complementary” trade with Burma.37 While President Kim Dae Jung has
been a consistent supporter of the Burmese democratic movement, South Korea is
keen to see international friction avoided in that part of the world.
In contrast, Burma’s foreign policies and their wider implications
do not appear to have attracted a great deal of interest on the part of Western
analysts and officials.38 This may soon change. Should the Bush administration
continue to see its relationship with Beijing in terms of a “strategic
competition” rather than the “strategic partnership” once envisioned by
President William J. Clinton, Burma’s close relationship with China could
assume much greater importance as an integral part of a much larger security
architecture. For example, the currently developing ties between the United
States and India, including shared interests in a ballistic missile shield, are
being viewed by some regional observers as part of a long-term move to offset
China’s strong security relationships with countries like Burma and Pakistan.
Similarly, American military aid to Thailand, aimed in the first instance at
stemming the flow of narcotics across the Burmese border, has been interpreted
as the beginning of a proxy struggle between the United States on the one hand
and China on the other, through their Thai and Burmese allies.39
For its part, China has much to gain from a close relationship
with Burma. The People’s Republic remains anxious about the security of its
frontiers, including its long border with Burma. The present government in
Rangoon-friendly and politically compatible, looking to China for support
against the Western democracies-is very much to Beijing’s liking. In any case,
the current alternative to the military regime is opposition leader Aung San
Suu Kyi, seen by Chinese leaders as strongly inclined to the United States; a
democratic government in Rangoon would thus add to China’s fears of strategic
encirclement by the United States and its allies.40 While regular Chinese naval
deploy ments to the Indian Ocean are a distant prospect, some analysts believe
that access to Burmese ports could eventually permit the People’s Liberation
Army Navy to “control and dominate the Indian Ocean’s [sea lines of
communication;' including the Straits of Malacca.41 Beijing is also keen to
develop the economy of southern China by exporting goods through a transport
corridor stretching from Yunnan to the Irrawaddy River at Bhamo and thence to
the Bay of Bengal.42 Burma is already exporting timber, agricultural and marine
products, and precious stones to China, and it is receiving light industrial
machinery and consumer goods in return.43
At the diplomatic level, the ASEAN countries are probably correct
in judging that China sees Beijing's as a sympathetic voice in regional
councils. In this regard, Beijing would not have to dictate terms to Rangoon,
as the Burmese regime already shares Beijing's views on such key issues as
internal security, human rights, and whether other governments and multilateral
organization are entitled to involve themselves in a country's domestic
affairs.44 In addition, China no doubt welcomes the addition of Burma to that
diverse coalition of countries around the world (including Russia, Iraq, Libya,
India, and Malaysia) that are concerned about the sole-superpower status and
global economic influence of the United States. These countries also distrust
the increased willingness of the United Nations since 1990 to intervene in
global crises in response to humanitarian sentiment or to promote regional
stability. China knows that its position on the Security Council is seen by the
Rangoon regime as the ultimate guarantee against a UN-sponsored military
operation to restore democracy in Burma or to create autonomous ethnic states,
as was done by the multilateral intervention in East Timor.45 In return, China
feels it can count on Burma's support in other UN debates on such subjects as
human rights and arms sales.
THE FUTURE
There are two main schools of thought about future Burma-China
relations.46 The first harks back to the great-power politics and strategic
balances of the Cold War era. Its advocates argue that small, poverty-stricken
Burma will inevitably succumb to the pressures of its much larger neighbor and
effectively become a pawn (if it is not already a pawn) in China's bid to
become a world power. The members of this school cite, in addition to China's
enormous strategic weight, its apparent "stranglehold" over Burma,
represented by loans, arms sales, and trade.47
The second school argues that throughout history Burma has always
been highly suspicious of China, that it turned to Beijing in 1989 only out of
dire necessity, having been ostracized by the West. Proponents of this view
claim that China has not been as successful in winning Burma's confidence as is
sometimes reported. They also believe that the Rangoon government would be
prepared to pay a very high price to remain independent, and they accept the
regime's repeated assurances that Chinese military bases will never be
permitted in Burma. Should the Rangoon government wish to break out of China's
embrace, this second school argues, then India, other regional countries, and
possibly even the Western democracies would be prepared to assist.49
The latter school reflects the deeper understanding of Burmese history.
The conclusion that Burma has become a satellite of China and would be a
willing ally in any future military confrontation between China and other
regional countries should not go unchallenged. Indeed, it can be argued that in
many respects it is not Beijing but Rangoon that has the whip hand. The
military regime recognizes Burma's considerable debts to China and its
vulnerability to a range of Chinese diplomatic, economic, and military
pressures, but it believes it can manage the bilateral relationship in a way
that preserves Burma's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom of
action.50 The regime may have been encouraged by the way that Chinese officials
in Burma have kept a low public profile and have learned to tread warily in
contacts with their Burmese counterparts. They seem to have behaved in this way
so as not to offend the notoriously volatile and unpredictable Burmese
leadership and thereby lose the gains China has made since 1988. The Chinese
may also retain memories of the violent anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon of 1967,
unrest that led to a break in diplomatic relations.
In any case, the State Law and Order Restoration Council and its
nominal successor, the (again, all-military) State Peace and Development
Council, have been quick to perceive Burma's growing importance in the
increasingly fluid Asia-Pacific strategic environment. Over its fourteen-year
history the military government has become adept at exploiting Burma's
geostrategic position and at manipulating the concerns of its regional
neighbors. For example, it has been quite comfortable about using its close
relationship with Beijing and the possibility of its becoming an ally of an
expansionist China to gain attention in important councils like ASEAN and to
attract support from influential rivals like India and Singapore.51
In addition, there are other security issues that are likely to
focus international attention on Burma over the next decade. For example, since
1988 the Rangoon regime has implemented a massive military expansion and
modernisation program. The Burmese armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) have
more than doubled in size and are now the second largest in Southeast Asia.
Should Vietnam continue to reduce its military, Burma's could become the
largest. Thanks largely to China, its armed forces are already among the best
armed. Since 1988 the Burmese air force has acquired nearly two hundred new
combat aircraft, the navy has commissioned more than thirty surface combatants,
and the army has been reequipped with a wide range of armoured vehicles,
artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and infantry weapons. The Tatmadaw still
has a number of serious problems to overcome, but has been transformed from a
small, weak counterinsurgency force barely able to maintain internal security
into a very large, much more powerful defense force, increasingly capable of
major conventional operations.52 While the Burmese armed forces still lack a
credible power-projection capability, regional countries like Thailand and
India have already expressed concern about Burma's rapidly growing strength and
cited it as justification for military acquisition programs of their own.
There are a number of other disturbing trends. Thailand and
Bangladesh, for example, continue to express concern about the wider
implications of Burma's persistent internal problems, particularly the periodic
outflows of refugees across its borders that these "internal
problems" often produce.53 Burma has also attracted strong criticism over
its failure to stem the flow of narcotics from the "Golden Triangle"*
and to take action to counter its rapidly growing HIV/AIDS problem. These
issues are seen, and not only by Burma's neighbors, as having far-reaching
strategic implications.54 For example, in 2000 the American secretary of state
characterized HIV/AIDS as Southeast Asia's greatest threat to health and
security.55 In addition, international attention has been drawn to Burma's use
of forced labor and child soldiers, its indiscriminate sowing of land mines,
its intolerance of religious minorities, and its traffic in small arms. The
Rangoon regime has been slow to react to international representations about
such issues; a rare exception occurred in 1992, when the State Law and Order
Restoration Council responded to protests by the Islamic countries of ASEAN and
permitted the repatriation of some Muslim Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh.
The plight of the Rohingyas had attracted the attention also of Islamic
extremists from Afghanistan and the Middle East-as well as that of the UN
secretary-general, who declared that he was "seriously concerned"
that the crisis could threaten the stability of Southeast Asia.56
In such a climate of uncertainty, interstate tension, and
incipient instability, Burma's geostrategic position is likely to become more
important to regional security than it was in past decades. Burma may also
become a player in the wider strategic environment, especially if the current
relationship between the United States and China develops into a more overt
competition, into which other Asia-Pacific states are drawn, for political and
economic influence. In these circumstances, Burma would probably attempt to
steer an independent course, while protecting its relationship with China as
far as possible. The U.S. government would come under domestic pressure to
maintain a hard line against Rangoon, but the realpolitik of great-power
rivalry could oblige it to change its policy toward Burma and to seek a more
neutral, if not closer, relationship. Should that occur, other Western
democracies would find it hard not to follow the American lead.
[Author Affiliation]
Andrew Selth is a visiting fellow at the Australian National
University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Center. He has published widely on
strategic and Asian affairs, including Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese
Armed Forces since 1988 (Canberra, 1996) and Burma’s Secret Military Partners
(Canberra, 2000). He has just completed a comprehensive study entitled Burma’s
Armed Forces: Power without Glory, which is due to be published in the United
States later this year. This article is drawn from Burma: A Strategic
Perspective, Asia Foundation Working Paper 13 (San Francisco, 2001). A shorter
version was presented at the conference on “Strategic Rivalries on the Bay of
Bengal: The Burma/Myanmar Nexus,” held in Washington, D. C., on 1 February 2001
and sponsored by the Asian Studies Center and Center for Peace and Security
Studies, Georgetown University; the Center for Strategic Studies of the CNA
Corporation; the Asia Foundation; and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
By Andrew Selth
This article represents the author’s
views alone. It has been drawn entirely from open sources and has no official
status or endorsement.
Copyright Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Naval War College Spring 2002. Provided by ProQuest LLC. For
permission to reuse this article, contact Copyright Clearance Center.